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NEGLIGENCE: MINOR HELD TO ADULT STANDARD OF CARE
WHILE OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE
Medina v. McAllister, 196 So. 2d 773 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
Operating his motor scooter on the public streets of Florida, plaintiff, age
fourteen, collided with an automobile owned and operated by the defendant.
Plaintiff brought an action based on the defendant's alleged negligence, and
the trial court, in a jury verdict, rendered judgment for the defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct
the jury that the standard of care applicable to him as a minor should be
more lenient than the standard applied to an adult. The Third District
Court of Appeal HELD, "to accord more lenient standards to a minor than
would be applied to an adult when judging his conduct in operating a motor
vehicle ... would be unrealistic, contrary to legislative requirements ... and
2
inimical to the safety of the public."' Judgment affirmed.
The instant case is one of first impression in Florida since the standard
of care applied to minors operating motor vehicles has not previously been
determined in this state. Earlier Florida cases concerning activities other than
the operation of motor vehicles embraced the general rule that children are
not held to the same standard of care as adults.3 This rule was justified by
the assertion that it is undesirable to burden the normal development of a
child with adult responsibilities that are beyond his capabilities.4 Therefore,
a minor had the "right" to have his age, experience, and immaturity considered as mitigating factors in the assessment of his conduct. 5 But now, in
view of Medina, a minor surrenders this "right" when he operates- a motor
vehicle in the State of Florida.
The court did not explicitly define the criteria for determining when the
adult standard of care should be applied to a minor. The court did, however,
emphasize the licensing theory, which maintains that licensing statutes
demonstrate a legislative intent that the operation of all motor vehicles
be governed by a uniform standard of care. The language of the Medina
holding states that if a minor is old enough to obtain a driver's license, and he
assumes the responsibility of operating a motor vehicle, he is held to the
adult standard of care. 6 The court again referred to the licensing rationale
when it stated it would be contrary to legislative requirements "to accord more
1. 196 So. 2d at 774-75.
2. A motion for rehearing was denied on April 10, 1967. Id. at 773.
3. City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, 74 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1954); Bagdad Land & Lumber
Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798 (1932).
4. 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1153 (1931). See W. Paoss, TORTS §32, at 157 (3d ed. 1964).
5. Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 110 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1959); Bermudez v. Jenkins, 144
So. 2d 859 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); McCain v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 110 So. 2d 718 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
6. 196 So. 2d at 774. Other jurisdictions such as California (Prichard v. Veterans Cab
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 727, 408 P.2d 360, 47 Cal Rptr. 904 (1965)), New Hampshire (Daniels v.
Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966)), New Mexico (Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50
(1965)), and Tennessee (Powell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn.
1966)) have recognized this rationale, which might be described as the "licensing theory."
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lenient standards to a minor than would be applied to an adult when judging
his conduct in operating a motor vehicle .... "7
Although the present decision was influenced by the licensing theory,
the court did not confine future application of the adult standard of care
to situations in which the minor either has, or is old enough to obtain, a
driver's license. Such a limitation would not provide adequate public protection; minors are allowed to operate self-propelled "vehicles" such as motor
boats without an operator's license. More significantly, judicial reliance on
mere licensing theory would disregard the obvious hazard - the minor who is
too young to obtain a license and nevertheless operates a motor vehicle. The
logic of the licensing theory indicates that such unlicensed juveniles might
escape imposition of the adult standard of care. Therefore, the Medina court
indicated it would not allow any minor, regardless of age or status, to escape
adult liability while operating a motor vehicle on the public streets of
Florida. Other jurisdictions similarly apply the adult standard of care to
minors engaged in activities which normally are undertaken by adults and
require adult capabilities." Respected authority also has indicated that judicial concern is not with ability to be licensed, but with the adult nature
of the activity in question as a prerequisite to the imposition of the adult
standard ° of care. 9 Operation of a motor vehicle unquestionably is such an
activity.1

This view of the court's rationale suggests that the Medina doctrine will
be extended to activities other than the operation of motor vehicles. Although
neither Medina nor its cited authorities specify such activities, it is significant
that the court does not narrowly limit its decision to the operation of motor
vehicles; rather it states that minors are to be held to the adult standard of
care when operating "a potentially dangerous instrumentality.""
The court further states that minors are to be afforded the lesser standard
of care only when they are "engaged in activities fitting their age . . . or . ..

[in] childish pursuits ... ."12 This language raises the obvious difficulties of
determining what constitutes a "potentially dangerous instrumentality" and
ascertaining which activities are not "childish pursuits." Firearms have already
been described as "dangerous instrumentalities" by Florida courts 3 and would,
therefore, be immediately included in the "potentially dangerous" category.
The judiciary, however, has been slow to extend the "dangerous instrumentality" label beyond motor vehicles and firearms. Nevertheless, explosives dynamite and highly volatile chemicals - seem just as "potentially dangerous"
7.

196 So. 2d at 774.

8. Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 63 Cal. 2d 727, 408 P.2d 360, 47 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1965);
Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966); Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50
(1965). See Powell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
9. W. PROSSER, TORTS §32, at 159 (3d ed. 1964).

10. In regard to this activity, the court in Medina ruled that the adult standard of
care was applicable to minors regarding contributory negligence, as well as primary
negligence. 196 So. 2d at 774.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So. 2d 605 (1941).
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as firearms and motor vehicles. Certainly these items are not ordinary objects
of "childish pursuit," and when they are involved there is little reason for
holding minors to a lesser degree of care than adults. Despite this, minors
traditionally have been afforded considerable protection by not being held to
the adult standard of care. Medina's departure from this longstanding authority can be explained by the fact that it is a policy decision, born of public
necessity. The number of motor vehicles in the United States has increased
radically within recent years. A substantial portion of this increase is because
scooters, motorcycles, motorboats, and automobiles have become readily accessible to minors. Consequently, traffic accidents continue to increase,'14 and
a disproportionate number of these accidents involve minors.'- These circumstances have forced courts to resort to more expedient considerations.
Medina weighed the interests of the involved minor against those of public
welfare and concluded that the minor must suffer the burden of adult
responsibility. This policy-oriented decisionmaking indicates that Medina
may be the first of a series of such decisions extending the adult standard of
care to minors, not only when they operate motor vehicles but when they
engage in any "potentially dangerous activity" that is not "fitting their age."
The rule expounded in Medina should become accepted, established
Florida law. A leading authority in tort law has recognized the need to hold
6
In
minors to an adult standard of care while operating motor vehicles.
addition, judicial sentiment throughout the United States indicates that the
modern trend is to apply the adult standard of care to minors under similar
circumstances.' 7 Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court has, in effect, affirmed the Medina doctrine and indicated that its rationale might be extended
to other areas of "adult activity." Such inference is warranted by the fact that
the recently approved jury instructions for Florida negligence cases recommends that minors be held to an adult standard of care while engaged in an
"adult activity."' 8

14. In 1959 the number of highway accidents totaled 10,200,000. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1960). In 1965 the total reached 18,200,000-an increase of
almost 30%. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTs 40 (1966).
15. In 1959 drivers under the age of 20 represented 7.2% of the total drivers in the
United States, 11.6% of the drivers involved in fatal accidents, and 13% of the drivers
involved in all accidents. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 53 (1960). By 1965,
drivers under the age of 20 represented 9.8% of the total drivers, 15.5% of the drivers
involved in fatal accidents, and 16.5% of the drivers involved in all accidents. NATIONAL
SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs 54 (1966). These disparities were the most glaring of all
age groups represented.
16. W. PROssER, ToRTs §32, at 159 (3d ed. 1964).
17. Research shows that at least sixteen states have held to this effect regarding primary
negligence: Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. In
addition, at least seven states have reaffirmed this doctrine regarding contributory negligence:
Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, and Tennessee.
18. On April 19, 1967, the Florida Supreme Court approved the committee's proposals.
In that section entitled Negligence §4-"Negligence of a Child," the committee noted that
the general charge regarding the negligence of a minor "may not be applicable when the
claim involves the negligence of a child occurring while he is engaged in an activity normally
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